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I. Introduction 
 How elections are funded has changed substantially in the past 20 years. Courts and 
legislation have altered the extent to which private actors can support candidates through 
spending. One result of recent judicial decisions has been increased public scrutiny applied to 
independent expenditure actors. Another interesting phenomenon is the change in how elections 
are predicted. America has long-established strict rules regarding gambling, including outlawing 
real money gambling on election results. In 2014, a website called PredictIt was created by 
researchers at Victoria University Wellington that allowed Americans to gamble with real money 
on election results (PredictIt). It was able to gain approval from regulators by limiting transaction 
amounts and operating primarily as a research project. Extensive research has been conducted on 
these markets, some of which will be discussed below. In this paper, I attempt to answer the 
question: “Are political actors responsive to measures of campaign competitiveness when 
allocating money towards campaigns? And if so, what sources of information are they most 
responsive to?” Prediction market data from U.S. House elections in 2016 and 2018 are used and 
the associated campaigns independent expenditures are taken from the Federal Elections 
Commission. Other campaign-specific variables are accounted for as well. The implied 
competitiveness of prediction markets will be mediated by other sources of information that 
actors can use to make spending decisions. Thus, I will compare the effects prediction markets 
and these other sources of information have on independent expenditures. I hypothesize that the 
relationship between prediction market prices and independent expenditures resembles an 
upside-down parabola wherein independent expenditures rise until the maximum implied 
competitiveness is reached, at which point they will decrease. After accounting for other 
variables, however, there is not a significant relationship between independent expenditures and 
prediction market prices. That said, the other sources of information have a significant effect on 
independent expenditures. Specifically, election competitiveness ratings derived from the Cook 
Political Report are significantly related to campaign spending in the parabolic way described 
earlier.  
II. Literature Review 
 To begin fitting prediction markets into the public opinion framework, one must first 
understand the mechanics of prediction markets. Recently, PredictIt has grown to become the 
dominant force in this type of market in the United States, likely due to its distinction as a 
research project allowing users to use real money in a way that would otherwise violate the law 
(PredictIt disclosures). A sufficient description of these markets is found in Joyce Berg, Forrest 
Nelson, and Thomas Retiz's "Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run" (Berg et al. 285). 
While the authors in that paper set out to describe the Iowa Election Market, the description still 
applies because PredictIt functions in a very similar way. In broad terms, users in these markets 
trade contracts that are priced based on the likelihood of a future event happening. In PredictIt's 
case, contracts that are validated (as in, the event occurs as prescribed in the contract) payout to 
$1. For example, a person may choose to buy contracts for a senator winning their election at 70 
cents if they believe that there is a likely chance of that happening. As buyers and sellers interact, 
the price where offers converge can be thought of as the group sentiment of the market 
participants. So, in a given market, buyers and sellers will be constantly interacting until a seller 
offers a price that no buyer matches or vice versa. This is what someone would see as the 'price' 
associated with the market, and in PredictIt's case can be thought of as the percentage of that 
future event occurring. A distinguishing characteristic of real-money prediction markets like 
PredictIt, versus prediction platforms in which predictors have no material risk, is the predictor's 
material leverage. A tenable assumption, therefore, is that users, especially in the aggregate, are 
more informed and attuned to political events than the average person. The implication is that the 
aggregate price of these markets should track well to actual results of elections.   
 After walking through the structure of prediction markets, Berg et al. evaluate their 
accuracy in predicting future elections. In doing so, they compared prediction market accuracy to 
polling accuracy. They generally found that markets were stronger predictive tools than polls, at 
least in the presidential elections from 1988-2004 that they studied (Berg et al. 288). This was 
true both within 5 days of the election and going back as far as 100 days before the election, with 
many of the results being significant (Berg et al. 295). This confirms a theoretical basis that the 
'show don't tell' idea with regards to prediction markets can be effective, as in, asking voters to 
predict the future can be more productive than asking whom they will support. Public opinion 
can help political actors strategize, but those actors may do well to instead strategize based on 
how other informed members of the political process, market participants, predict the political 
landscape to be.  
 There is a rich literature on the relationship between public opinion and political actors.  
To begin, there has been a large debate over the idea of an informed public opinion itself, and 
whether it can be measured by surveys. Such conversations, while important, will not be delved 
into in this paper. Instead, I am more concerned with the effect public opinion has on how 
political actors behave, including whether it exists. James A. Stimson writes effectively in his 
book Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics, (Stimson, 2015). He 
describes various players in the political process and how public opinion shapes their actions. 
One of his focuses is campaign professionals. He notes their use of polls, "not so much to gauge 
momentum as to measure whether their ads are building the image they want" (Stimson 92). He 
then reviews the complex predictive validity of polling but notes that they are more accurate later 
in the race. Stimson also describes the phenomenon of party actors reacting to public issue 
positions in a different chapter of Tides of Consent. He notes the intraparty conflict that can 
occur when the issue becomes strong enough to form a critical mass of support in the public. 
When that happens, party members that do not support it usually have to sign onto it, lest they 
risk estrangement from the party (Stimson 58). While this is not exactly candidate evaluation and 
campaigns reacting to that sentiment, it implies that political actors are in tune with what the 
public thinks and react based on it.  
The extent to which political actors respond to public opinion on the form of policy has 
been extensively researched. In fact, Public Opinion Quarterly, a research journal, is devoted 
almost entirely to this phenomenon. Robert Shapiro wrote a review of V. O. Key, Jr.'s, Public 
Opinion and American Democracy, one of the seminal texts on the subject, in the journal as a 
sort of 'where are we now' on the research question (Shapiro 982). He summarizes the recent 
scholarship on the question and finds that the association between public opinion and policy is 
generally robust, though the idea of causality is a difficult challenge (Shapiro 985). The review is 
very broad and touches on many different areas of policy responsiveness to public opinion. He is 
quick to note the limits of the existing research in the area, especially around having "sufficient 
data over time for a wide range of issues… to allow the kind of broad coverage, temporal 
sequences, and multivariate analysis needed to make causal inferences about responsiveness…" 
(Shapiro 1003-1004). He proceeds to mention a broader difficulty in social science of not being 
able to directly observe phenomena to be able to tease out a cause and effect (Shapiro 1005). All 
of this is to say that while there is some evidence of political responsiveness to public opinion, it 
is important not to overstate that effect. It stands to reason, therefore, that the analysis I am 
presenting that links political betting markets to campaign spending is necessarily incomplete 
and that it is exceedingly difficult to make causal claims based on the available evidence.  
 Martin Gilens' Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in 
America (2012) is a strong tour of the literature of the relationship between political actors and 
public opinion, with the added wrinkle of exploring the influence of an uneven distribution of 
political power in this process. Chapter 6 discusses how elections induce responsiveness to 
public opinion in elected officials and party institutions. He notes Anthony Down's framework of 
political parties as office-seeking coalitions (Gilens 156). This harkens to Downs' classic An 
Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy (Downs). Although there has been debate 
about some of the assumptions of rationality made in the article, my analysis will, for clarity, 
assume a similar framework for political actors. That is to say that I will assume that parties and 
partisans will be inclined to support candidates that they think are likely to win elections and that 
they will react to polling and betting markets as a metric for informed predictions to do so. 
Gilens uses longitudinal surveys to examine how reactive congressional policies are to the 
desires of the public, differentiating respondents by income levels. His topline results in this 
chapter are that responsiveness is always there, but it increases during presidential election years, 
and that legislators are most responsive to the interest of high-income earners, which he defines 
as those in the 90th percentile of income (Gilens 164). While this information is not directly 
related to the research topic, it increases the theoretical expectations that parties are responsive to 
the public by demonstrating that legislators are tuned into elite opinion.  
 Having established the relationship between public opinion and the behavior of elite 
political actors, a question arises: is there a relationship between prediction market conditions 
and the behavior of political actors, namely their spending decisions? If it is the case that these 
markets do fairly well in predicting political outcomes, especially in the longer term, as 
previously noted in Berg et al., it would be the case that political actors potentially behave 
strategically based on early market conditions. Namely, actors can take into account prediction 
markets when deciding how they choose to spend in elections. In this way, independent 
expenditures can paint the picture of how independent political actors choose to influence the 
political process. Richard N. Engstrom and Christopher Kenny analyzed the electoral effects of 
independent expenditures in their article "The Effects of Independent Expenditures in Senate 
Elections." (Engstrom and Kenny). Analyzing Senate elections in the 1980s and 1990s, they find 
that, generally, "independent spending by PACs can affect the vote decisions and that the effects 
are particularly evident when modeled as endogenous variables." (Engstrom and Kenny 896) 
That said, effects vary and can change over time. Therefore, independent actors can be 
reasonably confident in the influence their spending can have in a given election, solidifying the 
importance of strategic thinking when engaging in spending activity. Though one would be 
remiss to not mention that independent spending is not always conducted solely for the sake of 
helping a candidate win an election, nor is it the case that independent spending brings only 
positive effects for a political campaign. Diana Dwyre and Evelyn Braz note four distinct super 
PAC goals: candidate-specific advocacy, partisan advocacy, ideological advocacy, and access-
oriented (Dwyre and Braz 254). Of these four, only access-oriented goals would seriously hinder 
the assumptions made for the analysis conducted in this paper, so it is encouraging that Dwyre 
and Braz note that access-oriented Super PACS make up a vanishingly small portion of total 
Super PAC activity. (Dwyre and Braz 257). Anne Baker's article "Help or Hindrance? Outside 
Group Advertising Expenditures in House Races" slightly calls into question the assumed 
positive impacts of independent spending (Baker 313). She makes a distinction between PACs 
activities, which generally need to be documented, and what she terms 'dark money' 
organizations, 501©, that do not need to report spending for each specific candidate or race 
(Baker 315). One of her results is that the spending of these darker groups is more impactful in 
terms of affecting election outcomes than that of more conventional PACs. (Baker, 2018) In fact, 
she does not find a significant effect of PAC spending on early television advertisements on final 
vote margin at all (Baker 325). Having noted the strength of prediction markets in predicting 
elections, it would make sense that these actors would, or at least should, spend in part based on 
their conditions. My hypothesis, therefore, is that there will be a significantly positive 
relationship between independent expenditures and the competitiveness of elections implied by 
prediction markets. In this way, I assert that political actors, specifically those most in tune with 
political developments given they have the resources and desire to spend enough to be reported 
by the Federal Elections Commission, will be responsive in their spending based on what 
research shows is a moderately strong predictor of electoral success in prediction markets.  
III. Data 
 Data to complete the analysis came from multiple sources. For the prediction market 
prices, I requested data from all PredictIt markets that concerned congressional elections in 2016 
and 2018. I excluded markets in which a single candidate was named, which was usually 
worded: "Will [candidate] be reelected as representative of [district]?" In this way, only two-
sided markets were included. These markets either specified the primary party candidates' names 
or just contained the partisanship. The original data was structured so that each market was 
associated with an ID, with a different ID for each contract within the market, usually, one 
contract ID for each affirmative choice of a candidate winning, so two contract IDs for each 
market ID. For markets that did not specify candidate names, I used Ballotpedia to fill them in by 
matching the election and candidate partisanship. Each observation in this dataset showed the 
opening, average, and closing price for each contract on each day. Markets varied in how long 
before the election they began, and some did not necessarily resolve on election day. For each 
election I considered, I found three values using PredictIt's data: opening price, average price 
over the course of the election, and price on election day. This allows one to analyze the 
relationship between independent campaign expenditures and market prices over time. For 
campaign spending data, I used Independent Expenditure data from the Federal Election 
Commission (Federal Election Commission, 2016 & 2018). Specifically, only money spent in 
support of a named candidate was used in this research, as the topic concerns how political actors 
act in relation to prediction markets, and spending against candidates is more likely to be 
indirectly related to the support of a candidate. I aggregated the individual contributions for each 
candidate for which there was a prediction market and linked the two datasets. Summary 
statistics for prediction market prices and independent expenditures are below. 
Table 1: 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
 
Opening Price (Cents) 183 53.464 23.398 1 35 74.5 98 
Average Price (Cents) 183 52.134 24.490 5.319 34.333 71.548 96.096 
Closing Price (Cents) 183 53.011 29.428 1 28 78.5 99 
Independent 
Expenditures 
183 732,758.90 1,025,416.00 0.00 55,379.85 923,342.20 5,235,640.00 
        
 
The final dataset included daily trading activity for each contract of each market, spanning 
many of the markets focusing on Congressional elections run by PredictIt in 2016 and 2018, total 
independent expenditures in support of candidates of those elections, and Congressional District 
level Presidential Election results for the associated districts. It is important to consider other 
ways in which they can predict the competitiveness of a given election, as their goal is the 
efficient allocation of funds. Additional information for each market included the election year, 
2016 or 2018, the candidate's party affiliation, the Cook's Partisan Voting Index of that given 
district, a rating furnished by the Cook Political Report, and the incumbency status of the 
candidate. The Cook PVI measure was transformed so that it would be positive if the lean is 
towards the candidate's party, and negative if not. For example, if the PVI is R+5, a Democrat's 
PVI for the purpose of the data would be -5 and a Republican would be 5. For the Cook Political 
Report's race rating, which ranges from Likely Democratic, Lean Democratic, to Toss-up 
Democratic and vice versa for Republican. This variable was coded in a similar way to the PVI 
variable, where Likely Democratic was 3 if the associated candidate was a Democrat and -3 if 
the associated candidate was a Republican. Importantly, Cook did not rate elections that were not 
deemed competitive, so those elections to not have a value associated with them. This 
information is important because it notes other sources of information from which political 
actors can base their spending. The overall goal of this paper is to find whether these spenders 
make their decisions based on the information they can glean from prediction markets. The 
variety of sources specified can help do so. 
IV. Discussion 
 To examine the relationship between independent expenditures and prediction market 
prices, I begin by separating the prices into three categories: market open, market average, and 
price near market close. While the total spending variable is fixed on reflects spending at the end 
of the market, these price distinctions are still useful in that it can provide an intuition of 
convergence over time between the two variables. The graph below shows the relationship of the 
market prices across the three different categories to the spending of any given election, with a 
LOESS smoothed line and 95% confidence interval.  
 
It is noteworthy that there seems to be an indication of responsiveness between total 
spending and the competitiveness of an election as implied by pricing. In general, candidates 
near the 50-cent mark have more money spent on their behalf than those whose contracts are 
priced over 75 cents, implying a strong likelihood of victory, and those priced under 25 cents, 
implying a strong likelihood of loss. There is evidence to believe, therefore, that donors 
strategically spend their money based on a candidate's likelihood of victory. It is visually clear 
that the relationship between independent expenditures and prediction market prices is nonlinear 
and non-monotonic, implying that using ordinary least squares to estimate a statistical model 
would be unwise as it is not clear what polynomial function best captures the relationship 
between market price and total spending. The relationship resembles a negative quadratic curve 
with a maximum of 50 cents, especially when the price reflects the average market price and the 
closing market price. One can intuit, therefore, that not only do donors strategically spend their 
money, but their spending more closely reflects the implied competitiveness as the election 
proceeds. With this in mind, my hypothesis is that there is a statistically strong relationship 
between prediction market price and independent expenditures towards a given election. This 
would support the idea that funding is allocated efficiently between people who spend money to 
support elections and candidates of those races. However, it is important to note that other 
information can lead people to make electoral funding decisions. Thus, one must build a model 
that isolates the effects of the multiple different information streams at an independent 
expender’s disposal.  
I used a generalized additive model (GAM) to describe the relationship. Developed by 
Trevor Hastie and Robert Tibshirani, this method allows for independent variables to be 
smoothed to capture the nonlinear effect (Hastie and Tibshirani 298). It can also effectively 
include linear parameters in its specification, with coefficient interpreted the same way one 
would interpret coefficient in ordinary least squares. The reported estimates of the smoothed 
terms, however, are interpreted differently. When the independent variable is smoothed, "Each 
smooth is the sum of a number of basis functions, and each basis function is multiplied by a 
coefficient, each of which is a parameter in the model," producing many different coefficients 
(Ross). Instead, the effective degrees of freedom (edf) is reported, representing the "complexity 
of the smooth." (Ross). This estimate can best be thought of as the polynomial term associated 
with y = f(x) (Petukhina, et al. 4). Thus, "An edf of 2 is equivalent to a quadratic curve" (Ross). 
Three different models were used, to capture the three different types of market prices that were 
defined in the dataset. The specifications are below, for each candidate i in each election.   
 
 (1) 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐸 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦: 𝑅𝑖) +  𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖) + 𝛽3(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟: 2018𝑖) 
+ 𝛽4(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘’𝑠 𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘’𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖) +  𝜀 
 
(2) 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐸 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦: 𝑅𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖) + 𝛽3(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟: 2018𝑖) 
+ 𝛽4(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖) +  𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘’𝑠 𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘’𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖) +  𝜀 
 
(3) 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐸 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦: 𝑅𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖) + 𝛽3(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟: 2018𝑖) 
+ 𝛽4(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘’𝑠 𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘’𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖) +  𝜀 
 
 The results are found in Tables 2, 3, and 4 below. The results fit into the hypothesis that 
independent political actors spend strategically according to the implied competitiveness of a 
candidate in an election, as measured by the price of that candidate's contract in a betting market. 
In all three cases, the edf of the price variable was very close to 2, implying a quadratic 
relationship in which spending increases towards a certain point, after which it decreases. The 
term, however, is not significant. The edf associated with Cook's Ratings for elections, however, 
is significant in the opening price and closing price models. It, in a similar way to the price 
variable itself, implies a slightly more complicated quadratic relationship. The other independent 
variables also have interesting results. Incumbency is not a significant predictor of total 
spending, perhaps because incumbents are more likely to be clear favorites than challengers. 
They could also be more likely to benefit from party operations outside of the independent 
expenditure space. In all of the models, Republicans received less money from independent 
expenditures than Democrats. Importantly, as discussed earlier, this is just one category of 
spending that, distinctively, needs to be reported. There are categories of election spending that 
do not fall under independent expenditures and its reporting requirements. It would make sense 
that the smoothed term for Cook's PVI would be similar to that of market price, but the 
relationship is not as clear. This may be because of the lower variation of the PVI. Overall, there 
is no evidence that, controlling for the estimated independent variables, total average market 
price and the market price close to an election is strongly related to independent expenditures, 
implying an affinity towards competitive elections by political actors. Rather, the ratings from 
Cook's Political Report are more predictive of independent expenditures. This leads one to 
conclude that people who make independent expenditures do not respond to the information 
gleaned from political betting markets as much as they do the information from the media.   
Table 2: 
A. parametric coefficients Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 865502.0315 237067.8684 3.6509 0.0004 
Party: R -829447.3323 272603.3107 -3.0427 0.0028 
Incumbent 86322.7794 213998.4145 0.4034 0.6873 
Year: 2018 536782.0452 201217.0206 2.6677 0.0085 
B. smooth terms edf Ref.df F-value p-value 
Average Price (Cents) 2.1456 2.7314 1.9745 0.1040 
Cook’s PVI Towards 
Candidate 
2.0080 2.6050 0.5693 0.4925 






    
A. parametric coefficients Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 930914.3372 235144.1003 3.9589 0.0001 
Party: R -842369.9213 265478.8559 -3.1730 0.0018 
Incumbent 69178.6035 217540.4147 0.3180 0.7509 
Year: 2018 472161.8742 202992.4098 2.3260 0.0214 
B. smooth terms edf Ref.df F-value p-value 
Opening Price (Cents) 1.3270 1.5871 0.1545 0.7120 
Cook’s PVI Towards 
Candidate 
1.7219 2.2096 0.3923 0.6238 








    
A. parametric coefficients Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 943783.3180 235388.1215 4.0095 0.0001 
Party: R -849004.8615 264601.8220 -3.2086 0.0016 
Incumbent 74748.2158 217017.3456 0.3444 0.7310 
Year: 2018 457896.2888 202395.0081 2.2624 0.0251 
B. smooth terms edf Ref.df F-value p-value 
Closing Price (Cents) 1.4916 1.8269 0.4106 0.6075 
Cook’s PVI Towards 
Candidate 
1.8065 2.3299 0.4346 0.5850 




 This paper extends the existing literature on how political actors behave during elections. 
It proposes a new mechanism, political betting markets, to which actors respond. The results 
show that after controlling for other variables, there is not a significant relationship between 
betting market prices and the independent expenditures of associated campaigns. That is not to 
say, however, that no relationship exists at all. There is an association between the two measures. 
Other sources of information on electoral conditions, as specified in the model, specifically 
election ratings form Cook’s Political Report, affect how expenditures are distributed. In this 
way, there is evidence that actors allocate their resources at least in part by how competitive they 
see a given election. Future studies can examine different types of elections and different forms 
of spending to examine the behavioral impact of betting market prices. As these types of markets 
grow in popularity, it will be useful to compare their results to that of journalistic prognosticators 
and measures of public opinion. The issue of the effectiveness of campaign contributions is 
heavily contested in political science. This paper has pointed to there being at least some 
strategic decision-making on the part of campaign spenders. That is, they tend to support 
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